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The ‘forbidden fruit’: Islam and politics of identity in Kosovo and Macedonia 
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Abstract: 
This paper depicts the interplay of religion and politics, as well as of external and internal 
actors among Albanian communities in Kosovo and Macedonia. It argues that Islam has 
never been allowed into the political space, despite occasional attempts to politicise it 
and utilise it for political and nationalist expediency. This relative absence of Islam from 
the political sphere is due to a specific social and political context, as well as to a specific 
historical experience. However, one can depict a higher presence of Islam among 
Albanians in Macedonia, for reasons related to their position as a minority within an 
Orthodox majority country that is undergoing a process of reaffirmation of religion as an 
essential pillar of an emerging Macedonian national identity. 
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Introduction 
 
Apart
1
 from this internal process of politicisation of religion, the fall of Communism 
created new opportunities for many ‘faith-based’ international organisations and 
agencies to get involved in the process of transforming societies and identities. Once 
the Communist state, known for its firm secularising policies, “withered away” (Jović 
2009), Christian and Muslim organisations and agencies rushed in an attempt to fill 
the ‘spiritual void’ of post-Communism and exercise their influence in religious 
affairs. In the case of former Yugoslavia, many international religious organisations 
(often disguised as aid agencies) and networks from the Middle East and other 
Muslim countries entered into a competition to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the 
‘forgotten European Muslims’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, 
Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania. Nonetheless, their eventual success or failure in 
promoting often diverging traditions and models of religious practice largely 
depended and still depends on an interplay of several factors, ranging from internal 
                                                 
*
 Email: g.krasniqi@sms.ed.ac.uk 
identity dynamics within these societies to official state ideologies and state responses 
to external religious influence.  
Thus, this paper depicts the interplay of religion and politics, as well as of 
external and internal actors among Albanian communities in Kosovo and Macedonia. 
It does so by asking the following questions: Do external Muslim actors (Arab, 
Iranian, Turkish) play a role in the formation of Muslim identities and religious 
institutions in Kosovo and Macedonia? How does the state respond to the 
involvement of different actors, especially those from the Gulf and Turkey? To what 
extent does the 'Islamic' reference impact on the foreign policy orientation of Kosovo 
and Macedonia? How do Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia ‘reconcile’ their 
Muslim identity with a widespread sense of ‘pro-Americanism’? To what extent does 
Muslim identity play a role in perceptions of European Union policies and a future in 
the European Union? Before addressing these questions, however, it is important to 
briefly consider the role of religion in the formation of Albanian identity in the 
Balkans at the beginning of the twentieth century and the socio-political changes that 
characterised different Albanian societies in the Balkans following the fall of 
Communism. 
 
Religion and identity formation among Albanians in Yugoslavia  
 
Unlike most of the nationalisms that emerged in the 20
th
 century in the Balkans, 
Albanian nationalism was a secular one. This was largely conditioned by history, 
reality in the Albanian inhabited lands at that time and, most importantly, future 
political considerations. Albanian national(ist) leaders have traditionally avoided 
politicising religion because of the need to avoid internal divisions that would create 
dissent in the process of nation-building. Albanians belonged to three faiths, 
Catholicism, Orthodoxism and Islam (inluding adherence to many Sufi orders present 
throughout the region) and historically they did not have their own religious 
representative institutions. Thus, unlike Serbs, Croats, Bulgarians, Greeks, Turks and 
others, Albanians did not have what George Theotakas called a ‘national religion’. 
Instead, national and cultural leaders drew on common descent, ethnicity, and above 
all, language, to forge a common national identity. In such context, it is logical that 
Pasho Vasa’s saying ‘The faith of Albanians is Albanianism’ became the banner of 
Albanian nationalism in the twentieth century. Certainly, religious allegiance was 
strong among many Albanians, including many political and military leaders of the 
Albanian national movement in the 20
th
 century. This way, the secular-minded leaders 
had to try hard to convince some Albanian leaders from Kosovo—such as Isa 
Boletini, whose loyalty to Islam and the Sultan was very strong (Clayer 2007, 83)—to 
act against the Ottoman Empire.  
 
Identity formation in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
 
In the aftermath of the Balkan Wars and World War I (WWI), Albanians were 
territorially divided, with the majority of them living in Albania and the others mainly 
in the newly created Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which changed its 
name to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929. Albanians—both Muslims and 
Catholics who at that time made up around 70 and 30 per cent of the overall Albanian 
population, respectively—in Yugoslavia were not seen as integral members of the 
new Yugoslav state (the very name of the state tacitly excluded Albanians and other 
non-Slavic peoples (Poulton 2003, 126)) and were deprived of the resources (such as 
schools in mother tongue) to constitute itself as one. So, the state in general followed 
a two-track strategy. Firstly, Muslims, who were considered to be the remnants of the 
much-hated Ottoman Empire, were stimulated to migrate to Turkey.
2
 Then, the 
remaining Muslim population was urged to emphasise religion over nationhood as the 
main layer of their group identity. This was part of the state’s official ideology of 
‘Yugoslavism’ that recognised religious differences alone.   
Until 1929, all Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina and other ex-Habsburg 
territories were placed under the supreme authority of the office of the Reis-ul ulema 
in Sarajevo, while the supreme Mufti in Belgrade headed the Muslims of Serbia and 
Montenegro (Radić 2003, 1999). Only in 1930 was a new law on the Islamic 
Religious Community passed, uniting Muslims in one Independent Islamic Religious 
Community (Samostalna Islamska Verska Zajednica). The state policy was one of 
cultural and linguistic assimilation. In their initial attempts to assimilate the Albanian 
minority through state-sponsored schools, the first Yugoslav state brought to Kosovo 
and Macedonia Bosnian Serb-Croat-speaking Muslim teachers (Poulton 2003, 127) 
and replaced the Albanian mullahs (Muslim teachers) and imams who had embraced 
the cause of education in Albanian (Kostovicova 2002, 161). In interwar Yugoslavia, 
hence, Albanian Muslims became a ‘double minority’. They were both a linguistic 
and ethnic minority, dominated by the south-Slavic majority on one hand and Bosnian 
Muslims on the other. 
However, despite state attempts to create loyal Muslim citizens in Kosovo and 
Macedonia by instilling a de-Albanianised religious awareness, it is difficult to claim 
that religion was the main component of identity of Yugoslavia’s Albanians. Despite 
their everyday religious practices and their nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire, 
Albanians in inter-war Yugoslavia clearly distinguished themselves from their Slavic 
neighbours mainly on the basis of language and ethnicity. In terms of political 
representation, they mostly supported the Islamic League for the Defense of Justice 
(İslam Muhafaza-i Hukuk Cemiyet), known in its Turkish form of Cemiyet (Xhemijet 
in Albanian and Džemijet in Serbian). The League had been established in 1919 by a 
number of Albanian, Turkish and other large, influential Muslim landowners from 
Kosovo, Macedonia and the Sandjak. Albanians supported Cemiyet, which in essence 
was a religious party, for it was the only possible way to channel their political will. 
After the ban of Cemiyet in 1925, the other Muslim party in Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav 
Muslim Organisation (YMO) (Jugoslovenska Muslimanska Organizacija) with its 
centre in Sarajevo, failed to gain support among Muslims in Kosovo and Macedonia. 
This incidence alone could be taken as a clear indicator of the lack of feelings of a 
common identity based on common religious bonds among the Slavic and non Slavic 
Muslims in Yugoslavia (Babuba 2004, 298). 
 
Identity formation in Socialist Yugoslavia 
 
State-sponsored attempts to ‘Slavicise’ Islamic institutions in Kosovo and Macedonia 
did not abate after World War II with the creation of the socialist Yugoslavia. 
Although under the control of Bosnian Muslims, the Islamic hierarchy was 
reorganised, leading towards a decentralisation of religious affairs in Yugoslavia. In 
the case of Albanians, Serbian authorities in the SFRY tried to use religion to 
undermine the Albanian national cause. The aim was to strengthen the religious 
component of identity among Albanians to the detriment of the ethnic one. To weaken 
their position further, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Yugoslav authorities took 
measures to encourage Albanian Muslims in Kosovo to declare themselves as ‘Turks’ 
and subsequently urge them to migrate to Turkey, in accordance with an agreement 
signed between Yugoslavia and the Turkish Republic (Babuna 2004, 69-70).  
The Yugoslav policy toward Albanian Muslims had a most detrimental impact 
on the fabric of Albanian society: It severely damaged a long tradition of religious 
syncretism among Albanians, mostly practiced by various Sufi orders. In the name of 
secularisation and socialisation, Sufi tekkes in Bosnia were officially banned, and 
“mystic orders”3 in Kosovo were persecuted by state authorities. In fact, some of the 
tekkes were turned into cultural monuments protected by law and were open for 
visitors. Thus, the century long Albanian tradition of practicing Islam “in ways unique 
to the region, practices which included the synthesis of a number of local forms of 
spiritual traditions which ultimately evolved into complicated rituals in which 
Muslims and local Christians often shared the same spiritual site” (Blumi 2005, 2) 
was severely damaged as a result of the Yugoslav state authorities’ and the Islamic 
Community of Yugoslavia’s attempts to ‘mainstream’ Islam. As a result, by the end of 
1998, the Albanian population in Kosovo and Macedonia was homogenised in terms 
of the religion, with Sunni Muslims accounting for over 90 per cent; Catholics shrank 
to 4-5 per cent and only few Orthodox Albanians remained. The number of Catholics 
decreased mainly because of the emigration, whereas a considerable number of 
Orthodox Albanians were assimilated.  
In sum, throughout the first and second Yugoslavia, the religious identity of 
Albanians was repeatedly reshaped as a result of wider political developments in the 
Yugoslav space. However, despite state attempts to create an Islamic identity that 
superseded ethnicity, religion, though an important layer, remained subordinated to 
national identity and consciousness of most Albanians. The complex and problematic 
relation of Albanians with the Bosnian Muslims who controlled Islamic institutions in 
Yugoslavia – largely conditioned by the anti-Albanian attitude of the latter – is a 
useful indicator for the position of religion in the hierarchy of identity layers among 
Albanians. However, this does not imply that religion was not an important factor in 
self-identification of Albanians in Yugoslavia and affirmation of their ‘otherness’ vis-
à-vis Orthodox Serbs and Macedonians. In a way, religion and ethnicity had become 
intertwined.   
 Nonetheless, following the fall of Communism and the subsequent dissolution 
of the SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) in 1992, Albanians in 
Yugoslavia were divided into two new independent states, Macedonia and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, comprising of Montenegro and Serbia, which included 
Kosovo. For Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia, this new reality also meant new 
identity dynamics and the transformation of the organisation of their religious life 
within their respective polities. In terms of religious institutions, the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia at the same time signposted the end of the dependence on the Riyaset 
(office of the Reiss-ul ulema) and control from Sarajevo. This newly found 
independence in terms of religious organisation soon also led to the emergence of 
differential trajectories of Islam and politics in Kosovo and Macedonia. 
 
Religion and politics of ethno-national mobilisation in Kosovo in the 1990s 
 
On 23 March 1989, the state of Serbia revoked Kosovo’s autonomous status that had 
only been granted in 1974. This step was marked by a far-reaching and active 
campaign of ethno-national mobilisation among both Serbs and Albanians. In Serbia 
proper, the Serbian Orthodox Church—surely one of the main pillars of the Serb 
identity and sense of collective belonging—took on an active role in the country’s 
political and social life. Often, its priests were at the forefront of nationalist 
campaigns throughout the territory of former Yugoslavia (Helsinki Committee for 
Human Rights in Serbia 2006). On the verge of the war in Bosnia, nationalists as well 
as Church officials re-activated the notion of Serbs as the defenders of ‘Western 
civilisation and Christianity’ against the Islamic threat, initially manifested by the 
Ottoman Empire, and more recently by Bosnian Muslims and Albanians.   
Massive political and military presence of the Serbian state in what had been 
the autonomous province of Kosovo galvanised Kosovar Albanians into massive 
protests. These protests went beyond resistance against the Serbian policies and soon 
resulted in the creation of an impressive political and social movement known as the 
“parallel society” or the “phantom state” (Judah 2000, 61). Religious institutions in 
Kosovo, both the Catholic Church and the Islamic Community of Kosovo, became 
part of the Kosovar Albanian movement and took a role in the efforts to unite 
Albanians in Kosovo and transcend inter-group differences. One of them was the 
‘Action for reconciliation’, which aimed at the termination of blood feuds. It was led 
by an Albanian Catholic intellectual, Anton Çetta, who succeeded in resolving more 
than 2,000 feuds (half of them involving death) in the period 1990-1992 (Clark 2006, 
86). Apart from blood feuds, Ger Duijzings (2000, 126) has emphasised the role of 
religious leaders in settling disputes, pacifying and integrating rural society. In all 
these actions, the goal was that of integrative nation-building. Albanian political elites 
in Kosovo forged group homogeneity by eradicating diversity and multiple identities, 
and thereby created an atmosphere where only clear-cut identities would be accepted.  
 The 1990s witnessed a revival of religion in Kosovo, most impressively 
demonstrated through the resurgence of Sufi orders and their lodges. Yet, for most 
Albanians, the religious cause was subordinated to the national one, both in Catholic 
and Muslim communities. Despite repeated claims of Serbian nationalists, the Serb-
Albanian conflict, which erupted in the armed conflict of 1998-99, was not religiously 
motivated—it was a conflict with a clear ethno-national bias. Even at the pinnacle of 
war, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) refrained from enlisting Islamist militants 
from the Arab countries and other Muslim countries (Judah 2000, 175). This relative 
distance to the Islamic umma and the insistence on a Western orientation were also 
present in other Albanian organizations, such as the Democratic League of Kosovo 
(Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës - LDK). The LDK was the first post-Communist party 
of Albanians in Kosovo established in December 1989, and it was the cornerstone of 
the Kosovar Albanian parallel society in the 1990s. Together with Albanian 
intellectuals, the LDK did everything to demonstrate their Western orientation. It was 
an unwritten rule that the first deputy-president of the party should be an Albanian 
Catholic. Other examples of the inter-religious cooperation to the benefit of the 
national cause and demonstration of their Western orientation include the initiative to 
form a Christian Democratic Party
4
 (with mixed Muslim and Catholic members), 
rallying around Catholic symbols, such as Mother Theresa, and attending Catholic 
ceremonies (Clark 2000, 66). This counter-intuitive initiative was meant to convey a 
strong symbolic message of Albanians as a people united in its struggle for freedom 
and statehood.  
 Following the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia, the Supreme Council of the 
Yugoslav Islamic Community for Serbia, which was based in Prishtina, changed its 
name to the Islamic Community of Kosovo (Bashkësia Islame e Kosovës – BIK), thus 
taking full responsibility of organising Muslim religious life in Kosovo. BIK 
functioned within the framework of the self-styled ‘Republic of Kosovo’ and as part 
of the ‘parallel society’. In 1992, BIK managed to establish the Faculty of Islamic 
Studies in Kosovo with Albanian as the language of instruction.
5
 This faculty became 
the most important institution in the educational promotion of a traditional 
understanding of Islam with a strong Albanian rooting.  
 It would be fair to say that throughout the 1990s, religious identity and 
institutions were utilised by political and religious leaders to achieve political and 
national cohesion. The ethnic and linguistic commonalities that bound Albanians 
together, as well as the threat coming from the Serb state, helped to supersede 
religious differences between Catholic and Muslim Albanians. In the 1990s, no 
Kosovar Albanian political party or association of any importance rallied around 
Islamic symbols, let alone a language of Islamic fundamentalism “as an ideology that 
seeks to re-establish the religion of Islam as a political system in the modern world” 
(Choueiri
 
1999, 255) in opposition to the Serbian regime. Religious motives—in this 
case Muslim ones—did, however, play a role in defining and constructing the self-
image of many Albanians in opposition to the Serbian (Orthodox) ‘Other’. Yet this 
Islam was a ‘Popular Islam’, not an Official Islam; it was a “widespread and 
spontaneous expression of a religious inclination that is a mixture of conventional 
wisdom, local culture and personal piety” (Choueiri 1999, 255). This development 
was also conditioned by the overall isolation of Kosovo and its population throughout 
Serbian rule in the 1990s, an isolation that largely meant immunity from external 
religious influences.  
The armed conflict in Kosovo (1998-9) proved fatal to the material religious 
culture of Kosovo. According to the Islamic Community of Kosovo, approximately 
200 of the more than 600 mosques in Kosovo were damaged or destroyed during the 
war, along with Sufi lodges and Islamic schools (Medreses), archives and libraries 
(Herscher 2006, 41). It was the sheer scale of the human rights violations being 
committed in Kosovo that led to the military intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in spring 1999. 
Thus, as a result of the NATO intervention, Kosovo started a transition to democracy 
and self-governance under the United Nations administration.  
 
Kosovo in the post-1999 period: The Globalisation of Islam in the context of UNMIK  
 
The establishment of an international administration in Kosovo in June 1999 under 
the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) paved the way for an invasion of 
various aid organisations from all around the globe. Thankful to the international 
community and above all to the NATO states for having come to their aid, 
impoverished and devastated Kosovars tended to welcome anyone who would assist 
them in reconstructing their homes and their country. With the international 
community lacking a coherent policy to address the needs of the people, the latter 
were left “at the mercy of international, ‘faith-based’ organisations that claim to 
represent their best interests” (Blumi 2005, 2). Moreover, the new administrators of 
Kosovo (UNMIK), failed to fully understand the complex picture of religious life and 
identity in Kosovo, including the rich traditional local habits and idiosyncratic 
practices. Decision makers and administrators used an oversimplified tableau that 
divided people into a matrix of two fixed, homogenous and colliding identity groups: 
According to this view, the majority Albanians, who were seen as Sunni Muslim 
stood against the minority Serbs of Orthodox faith. Approaching issues of religious 
identity and heritage through this dichotomy had a series of devastating effects for 
Kosovar Muslims, as will be discussed below. It also suggests that many international 
administrators were often led by their ignorance and their prejudices against the 
region in general and Islam in particular. 
 Indeed, followers of a more radical form of Islam, commonly referred to as 
‘Wahhabism’6, had established a presence and become active in the Western Balkan 
region in the aftermath of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Whilst radical Islam first 
spread in Bosnia as a residual effect of the war, bringing aspects of the Islamic world 
previously unknown to the Muslims in the Balkans, it soon spread through other 
countries of the region, namely Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia (Morrion 
2008, 1) The arrival of foreign faith-based organisations and charity groups after 1999 
marked the first ‘face-to-face’ meeting of Kosovo’s Muslims with radically different 
forms of ‘Islam’—missionaries from the Gulf who preach a much more conservative 
and fundamentalist form of Islam, known also as ‘Wahhabism’. With the permission 
of UNMIK
7
, several Saudi-based humanitarian agencies such as the Saudi Red 
Crescent Society, the International Islamic Relief Organization, the Muslim World 
League, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth and numerous private Saudi charitable 
organizations, which were operating under the umbrella of the Saudi Joint Committee 
for the Relief of Kosovo and Chechnya (SJCRKC), arrived in post-war Kosovo to fill 
in the ‘spiritual vacuum’ and meet the material needs of Kosovo’s Muslims (Blumi 
2005, 1).  
Kosovo’s post war reality, characterised by a weak or non-existent system of 
government and state institutions, and the disregard shown towards the enormous 
needs of the devastated rural areas, created the ideal ground for the success of Saudi-
funded organisations. Many such organisations took a major role in the provision of 
food and health services to the population, which they often used to spread religious 
education. They also supported the reconstruction of destroyed or disused mosques 
and the building of new ones throughout the country. The newly built mosques were 
not only different in style from the Ottoman architecture of older Kosovar mosques, 
but their imams, frequently connected to these organisations, also began preaching a 
Salafi form of Islam, which had little in common with the ‘Popular Islam’ and Official 
Islam in Kosovo.  
Specialised Koranic schools were opened as well. The Islamic Endowment 
Foundation (IEF), which operates under the umbrella of the SJCRKC, established and 
actively supports more than 30 specialized Koranic schools in Kosovo’s rural areas 
(Blumi 2005, 15). As a result, a small number of young girls and women took to 
wearing the niqab (the Saudi-inspired full body and face veil), while small groups of 
young men began to grow long beards. In addition, as a result of the emergence of 
more radical practitioners of Islam, a tacit ‘mosque war’—i.e. competition between 
traditional practitioners and Imams and Salafi ones over the control of the mosques in 
Kosovo—began after 1999. However, claims of Islamic fundamentalism in both cases 
are difficult to verify and they may also be part of the power dynamics within the 
local communities in Kosovo. Because of the heavy symbolic weight it carries, the 
term ‘Wahhabi’ often seems to be used in cases of conflicts of interest for the purpose 
of discrediting one’s opponents.  
 
Toward a ‘Political Islam’ in Kosovo? 
 
Despite the increase of the number of foreign faith-based organisations and religious 
networks in Kosovo and their efforts to influence religious identities, one could hardly 
speak of the consolidation of ‘Political Islam’ in Kosovo or even of an imminent 
Islamist domination. Constitutionally, Kosovo is a secular state and is neutral in 
matters of religious beliefs. The Kosovar Constitution
8
 guarantees freedom of belief, 
conscience and religion, including the right to accept and manifest religion, the right 
to express personal beliefs and the right to accept or refuse membership in a religious 
community or group (Article 38). Likewise, the Republic of Kosovo ensures and 
protects religious autonomy and religious monuments within its territory (Article 39).  
Besides, none of the major political parties of Albanians is affiliated to Islam. The 
only political party that is often identified as an Islamic party is the Party of Justice 
(Partia e Drejtësisë – PD), founded in 1999. This party, which since 2011 is 
represented both in the Kosovar Parliament and Government, is promoting the 
preservation of local (religious) tradition. According to its political program, the PD is 
based “on principles of conservative democracy… and on the values of national and 
religious identity”9. The party declares its opposition to any extremist ideology that 
contradicts international conventions on human rights and engages in the promotion 
of religious tolerance in Kosovo. In terms of its declared goals, the PD is probably 
much closer to Christian democratic tradition in Western Europe than to Islamist 
movements in the Arab world. In terms of the regional politics, however, it promotes 
closer ties with Turkey. 
 Ever since the emergence of the first Albanian political parties in Kosovo, the 
latter applied the strategy of rapprochement with Kosovo’s Western allies as an 
antidote to the politicisation of Islam in Kosovo and to religious fundamentalism. 
Certainly, both the secular character of Albanian nationalism and strategic political 
calculations of the political elites in Kosovo condition these developments. Kosovo’s 
late President Ibrahim Rugova, who showed great sympathy toward the (Christian) 
West and provided extraordinary support to Kosovo’s Catholic minority, championed 
this policy more than anyone else. Rugova and other politicians did everything to 
undermine the role of Islam in politics in Kosovo, sometimes to extremes. Dreaming 
of an Albanian identity that is European, Kosovo’s political leaders have often gone 
too far in suppressing and undermining the Islamic layer of Albanian identity. An 
interesting case in point is an international incident that occurred in 2003 that shows 
how Islam has been suppressed even to the point of becoming a taboo. It happened 
when the OSCE Mission in Kosovo invited representatives of Kosovar institutions, to 
a working visit to Germany. When the delegation discovered that their interpreter 
would be an Albanian OSCE employee wearing a headscarf, they cut their trip short 
as a sign of opposition (Cufaj 2003). To the Kosovar delegation, this behaviour was 
unacceptable, conveying a wrong message to the West and a ‘false’ representation of 
Albanians’ ‘real’ identity. On the other hand, for OSCE officials, the interpreter was 
free to express and practice her religion. In this case, “[t]he religious factor disturbed 
the dominant nationalist meta-narrative on Kosovar Albanian identity” (Krasniqi 
2007, 18). 
In a more recent case, the Ministry of Education adopted an Administrative 
Instruction (No. 6/2010) that introduced a ban on headscarves in public elementary 
and secondary schools. As a result, some headscarf-clad girls were prevented from 
entering their schools in different locations, upsetting many Muslims in Kosovo. On 
18 June 2010, these Muslims organised a rally in Prishtina, the capital, which was 
attended by some 5,000 women wearing headscarves and by bearded men. This 
protest, which was the biggest one organised in Kosovo against religious 
discrimination, attracted considerable media attention both locally and internationally. 
Another smaller protest was organised in October. On the other hand, although BIK 
opposed the ban and promised to take the case to the Constitutional Court of Kosovo, 
it opposed these protests, calling for institutional means of solving the problem. 
Certainly, both cases are symptoms of a growing tension between a rather conjectural 
tendency of ‘self-negation’ (to convince Europeans that Albanians are not really 
Muslims) and the increasing role of Islam in Kosovar society and politics.  
As far as behaviour towards foreign interference is concerned, Kosovo’s 
institutions and their supporting states did almost nothing to control the flow of 
foreign aid networks. Even after 9/11, various NGOs from the Gulf were left 
unhindered in their activities. The only change was the one in popular perception, 
with people beginning to look at these foreign NGOs with greater suspicion. The 
situation is almost the same in the aftermath of Kosovo’s independence. One 
important factor is that now, as then, Kosovar institutions have limited capacities to 
control the flow of people and ideas in Kosovo.  This leaves enough space for foreign 
intervention.    
 
Islam and foreign policy orientation of Kosovo 
 
Religion influences Kosovo’s foreign policy orientation in a very unusual manner. 
Suffering from an unexplainable complex of inferiority and driven by the need to 
align itself with the ‘free and democratic world’, Kosovar leaders have been wary of 
any tendency to bring Islam into the political space. Most striking is that Kosovar 
leaders utilise and politicise the religion of the minority, that is Catholicisim, and 
undermine Islam, the religion of the majority. As a local commentator put it, 
“Catholicism, the religion of less than 10 per cent of the Albanian population of 
Kosovo, is being marketed politically in attempts to show a perceived cultural shift of 
Muslim Kosovars towards the West, mediated by Catholicism“ (Sinani 2008). It all 
started with the use of Mother Teresa’s figure in the form of portraits, statues and 
street names, and continues today with the erection of a huge Catholic cathedral in the 
centre of Prishtina, which, not surprisingly, will carry her name. Kosovar leaders are 
using the resurgent Catholicism, referred to as “cultural baptism” by the Bishop of the 
Catholic Church in Kosovo, as a European political ID card (Sinani 2008).   
In line with this strategy, Kosovo’s leaders have consistently shown signs of 
hesitation in establishing closer ties with predominantly Muslim states, especially 
those in the Gulf. Though in desperate need of being recognised by more states, 
Kosovo has been hesitant to approach member states of the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference and those from the Arab League. It would not be exaggerated to 
say that this reluctance is rooted in the fear of being labelled as a ‘Muslim State’. 
However, in an unusual move, the Kosovar government has decided to appoint the 
former Mufti of Kosovo, Rexhep Boja as its Charge d’Affairs in Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia. This might be an indication that the Government is actually acutely aware of 
the influence of Kosovo’s religious leaders in the ‘Muslim world’ and tends to use 
this influence for immediate political gains. 
 Nevertheless, Kosovo’s partner states with a Muslim majority are Albania 
(seen as the kin state by many Kosovar Albanians) and Turkey.
10
 The existence of 
multi-level ties—historic, political, religious, personal (built as a result of migration in 
the twentieth century)—between Albanians and Turkey make the latter an important 
actor and ally. Turkey has increased its diplomatic and cultural presence in Kosovo 
since 1999. It has been one of the first countries in the world to recognise Kosovo’s 
independence and provides considerable political and economic support. This 
enhanced cooperation has created suitable conditions for a higher presence and 
increased activity of Turkish cultural, educational and faith-based state agencies and 
NGOs, such as TIKA (Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency), 
Diyanet (the Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey), and other 
organisations and educational institutions which are part of the Gülen Movement
11
 
network. Just in 2006, TIKA implemented 32 different projects in Kosovo.
12
  Many of 
the religious and cultural objects representing Ottoman heritage in Kosovo are 
reconstructed with funds from TIKA and the Turkish government. In a recent visit to 
Kosovo, Turkey’s Prime Minister opened the Fatih Mosque (built in 1461) in 
Prishtina, which was reconstructed by Turkey.  
Albanians see Turkey as their traditional ally and an ally of the West, above 
all, of the US, making Turkey a ‘trustworthy’ partner of Kosovar Albanians in their 
efforts to create a modern European state and identity. Undoubtedly, this opens up the 
space for an easier penetration of Turkish organisations into Kosovar society. It seems 
that this space is being filled effectively through investments in education, through the 
publication and dissemination of books and other religious materials. The proximity 
of the Turks to the forms of Islamic tradition in Kosovo and the positive image of 
Turkey among Albanians ease the former’s exercise of influence. At a time when 
short-term political considerations (especially the ones related to the consolidation of 
the state of Kosovo internationally, a field where Turkey is giving a substantial 
contribution) dominate the public opinion and debate, much criticism has not been 
expressed towards the Turkish presence as some form of neo-Ottoman domination. 
 
Religion and politics in Macedonia: the ‘clash of civilisations’?  
 
After the declaration of its independence in 1991, Macedonia went through a peaceful 
and gradual process of democratisation, coupled with a policy of ethnic and religious 
privileging of the majority, which resulted in a state controlled by the Macedonians, 
that is by the Slavic speaking Orthodox majority. Unlike in other former Yugoslav 
republics, independence came without violence and armed conflict, but nevertheless 
involved an exclusive nation-building process. The so-called national homogenisation 
process had already begun in the 1980s, and intensified after the declaration of 
independence. The principal concern of nationalising elites was the role of the 
Albanian minority (comprising almost one quarter of the overall population), whose 
leaders insisted on the status of ‘constituent people’ in the country. For the political 
elites of the Macedonians, however, effective control of the state was seen as a 
precondition for the building of a homogenous Macedonian nation-state and a 
distinctive Macedonian identity. The institutionalisation of this ethnic and religious 
dominance was legalised with the adoption of a new constitution in 1991, which 
defined Macedonia as a “national state of the Macedonian people, in which full 
equality as citizens and permanent co-existence with the Macedonian people is 
provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanics and other nationalities living in the 
Republic of Macedonia”, and speaks of “the Orthodox Church of Macedonia and 
other religious communities and groups”13, thus underpinning a privileged treatment 
for the religion of the majority.    
 The position of Albanians was downgraded significantly (Spaskovska 2010, 
7). From being a nationality in the SFRY, they were demoted to a ‘national minority’ 
in the new state of Macedonia and felt threatened by the Orthodox majority in the 
state-led campaign of reinforcing the fragile state and national identity. Like in other 
Orthodox-majority states in the region, religion came to play a decisive role in the 
definition of modern national identity. The revival of religion and a more prominent 
role of the Macedonian Orthodox Church in the public sphere created a “popular 
belief that there is no significant ethnic context outside religious identity” 
(Vlaisavljevic
 
2003). Especially under the right wing government in Skopje, the 
Orthodox Church of Macedonia received a very privileged treatment, reminiscent of 
the alliances between ‘the altar and the throne’. 
 As far as the Albanians in Macedonia were concerned, the post 1991 period 
was experienced as a time of insecurity both in terms of their national and their 
religious identity, as both Albanian ethnicity and Islam were deemed incompatible 
with the Macedonian elite’s vision for a national Orthodox Macedonian state. In this 
context, religion and ethnic identity were merged into a single cause that needed to be 
fought for and defended. Nathalie Clayer (cited in Babuna 2000, 83-4) argues that the 
fusion of the national and religious identities seems to be a reaction of the Muslim 
Albanian minority against the Orthodox Macedonian majority under specific social 
and political conditions. Since Albanians comprise the biggest Muslim group in 
Macedonia, with Turks, Roma, Gorani and Muslim Slavic Macedonians accounting 
for the rest, they felt they should be the front-runners in the battle with the state for an 
equal status of Islam within the state. In reality, relying on the tradition established 
under Communism which ‘reserved’ a privileged position for the Slavic Muslims in 
the Islamic Council, the Macedonian state has made attempts to keep under control 
the Islamic Religious Community of Macedonia, either through the appointment of a 
Slavic Macedonian as its head, or through the creation of an alternative organisation.
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However, a Muslim Albanian has led the Islamic Religious Community since 1993, 
when the latter became independent from the Islamic Community of Yugoslavia.  
 In the spring of 2001, an Albanian guerrilla group, the National Liberation 
Army (NLA), engaged in armed conflicts with the Macedonian security forces. NLA 
demanded full legal, political and religious equality (a partner nation status) for 
Albanians in Macedonia. After months of sporadic fighting, which claimed hundred 
of lives, Albanian and Macedonian political representatives under external pressure 
(mostly from the NATO and the European Union) signed the ‘Ohrid Framework 
Agreement’. This agreement paved the way for major political reforms that improved 
the rights of the Albanian minority in Macedonia. As far as the religious factor is 
concerned, during the 2001 conflict, the relations between the Islamic Community of 
Macedonia and the Macedonian Orthodox Church deteriorated further because both 
organizations acted as religious wings of the rival ethnic groups (Babuna 2003, 17). 
After the conflict, in an attempt to reduce the privilege of the Macedonian Orthodox 
Church, Albanians demanded that the Islamic Religious Community be mentioned 
besides the Orthodox Church in Article 19 of the new constitution as one of the 
country’s religious communities. The demand was fulfilled. In addition, a Council for 
Inter-religious Cooperation was formed in Skopje in 2002 (Mojzes 2007, 797).  
 
Global discourses of the ‘war on terror’ and external influences 
 
The 2001 conflict in Macedonia was not primarily about religion. Yet with the global 
effect of the 9/11 bombings, religion would eventually become the key element of 
distinction, also in Macedonia. Islam became politicised by both the state and by the 
Albanian community, albeit in different ways. During the Albanian insurgency in 
2001, the Macedonian state had already made an attempt to imbue an Islamist and 
fundamentalist character in the Albanian leadership and tried hard to prove that the 
National Liberation Army (NLA) had ties with Islamic groups in the Balkans and 
elsewhere. After the 9/11 events, this discourse was much easier to launch in Europe 
and the US. As elsewhere, Macedonian politicians sought to capitalise on the ‘war on 
terror’ and thereby strengthen their position vis-à-vis Albanians. Almost a year after 
the end of the conflict in Macedonia, in March 2002, the Macedonian Ministry of 
Interior announced that it had executed seven foreign militants of a terrorist group that 
“was in the area with the aim of attacking vital installations, Macedonian officials and 
the embassies of Germany, Great Britain and the US in Skopje" (BBC, 2 March 
2002). The police also said that they had found uniforms of the disbanded ethnic 
Albanian rebel group, the National Liberation Army, and video footage was shown in 
support of the claim. Before long, a rather sad truth was revealed—the seven victims 
were not terrorists, but illegal migrants who were transiting Macedonia to reach the 
EU. Even after this tragic event, the Macedonian state and security apparatus has 
appropriated ‘anti-terrorism’ discourse in order to portray the mostly Muslim 
Albanians with suspicion. Evocative of Samuel Huntington’s concept of the ‘clash of 
civilisations’, nationalist Macedonian circles tended to draw a line of essential 
difference between the ‘right side’ and the ‘wrong side’, with the Albanians 
occupying the latter. 
 As far as the Albanian parties in Macedonia are concerned, none of them has a 
religious affiliation, even though they have constantly attempted to control the 
institution of the Islamic Religious Community. Nevertheless, various requests 
coming from Macedonia’s Albanians, deemed to be national in their essence, often 
assume religious connotations, largely because the contested nation-building of the 
Macedonian majority is deeply intertwined with the re-emergence of Orthodoxy. A 
case in point is the ongoing debate on the urban revitalisation project ‘Skopje 2014’, 
which foresees the erection of a series of historical monuments in the city centre, 
together with a new church.
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 Outraged by what they see as an attempt by Orthodox 
Macedonians for the symbolic appropriation of the landscape and territory, Albanian 
NGOs and the Islamic Religious Community have reacted by demanding permission 
to rebuild an old Mosque, which had been destroyed decades before by the Yugoslav 
state (before WWII). Since religious and ethnic cleavages in the case of Macedonians 
and Albanians more or less correspond with one another, politics and religion are 
easily confounded. 
 Another important factor of Muslim Albanian identity in Macedonia is a result 
of its interaction with neighbouring Kosovo, the channel through which the external 
influence of Muslim organizations reached Macedonia. With the Kosovo war in 1999, 
many faith-based aid agencies arrived in Macedonia to provide help for Kosovar 
refugees. Later on, they spread their activities in Macedonia where several Saudi-
funded mosques have been built in the Albanian villages. As a result, a power struggle 
seems to have begun within the Islamic Religious Community between the moderate 
mainstream and the radical (Wahhabi) wing. Whilst leaders of the Islamic Religious 
Community in Macedonia do not deny the presence of the Wahhabis in the country, 
according to the more moderate Muslims, the Wahhabi sect now controls five 
mosques in Skopje (Testorides 2010). Despite the fact that the presence of Wahabbis 
in Macedonia is undeniable, these claims and counter-accusations might as well have 
political connotations. Major political parties representing Albanians in Macedonia, 
the Democratic Union for Integration (Bashkimi Demokratik për Integrim – BDI) and 
the Albanian Democratic Party (Partia Demokratike Shqiptare – PDSH) have been 
engaged in a struggle for control of the Islamic Religious Community of Macedonia 
for years. The latest developments in the Isa Beg mosque in Skopje might be part of 
this political struggle for control as well. 
The Islamic Community of Macedonia has received donations from different 
Islamic networks, such as the Islamic Bank of Development, mainly through its links 
with the humanitarian organization ‘el-Hilal’ (Babuna 2003, 16). However, recent 
conflicts within the Islamic Community in Macedonia have raised concerns about the 
rise of more radical Islam in Macedonia. On the other hand, the Macedonian state, 
overall, has kept a closer eye on the activities of foreign organisations, mainly because 
of the fear of radicalization of Muslim communities and further destabilization of 
what has been a rather fragile country throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Nevertheless, 
nationalist Macedonian circles have made attempts to use the alleged ‘Islamic threat’ 
to instil fear in the public and to legitimise their anti-Albanian stance via Europe and 
the US.  
 Despite Macedonia’s Orthodox nation-building process, and especially after 
the resolution of the tensions between the Albanian minority and the Macedonian 
state, Turkey became a key actor in Macedonia, enhancing cooperation between the 
two countries. Consequently, the number of Turkey-based organisations increased 
their presence in Macedonia in the realms of religion, culture and education. This 
presence coincided with the increased role of Turkey in the Balkans, yet preceded it in 
part by Turkey’s policy to keep Greece’s regional politics in check. However, one 
should note that both parties, Albanians and Macedonians, view Turkey as an ally, but 
not as a mutual one. Macedonia sees Turkey as a counterbalance to Greece's 
ambitions towards Macedonia. On the other hand, Albanians historically saw Turkey 
as an ally against their Orthodox neighbouring states.
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 The Islamic and Ottoman 
heritage in Macedonia remains a source of disagreement between Albanians and 
Macedonians. Albanians, on the other hand, consider the Ottoman heritage to belong 
to them as the biggest Muslim population and as people who have used it for religious 
purposes for centuries. On the other hand, the Macedonian state insists on the fact that 
the Ottoman heritage belongs to all its citizens as a cultural heritage and to 
Macedonia’s tiny Turkish minority. Turkey's claims to this heritage might alienate 
Albanians in Macedonia, whose primary concern is to improve their national status 
and position within the state.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has addressed the interplay between Islam and politics and internal and 
external actors among Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia. It argued that Islam has 
never been allowed into the political space, despite occasional attempts to politicise it 
and utilise it for political and nationalist expediency. This relative absence of Islam 
from the political sphere is due to a specific social and political context, and due to a 
historical experience which forced Albanian nation-builders to de-emphasise religion. 
Nevertheless, differences do exist. One can depict a higher presence of Islam among 
Albanians in Macedonia, for reasons related to their position as a minority within an 
Orthodox majority country that is undergoing a process of reaffirmation of religion as 
an essential pillar of an emerging Macedonian national identity. It is precisely this 
factor and the overlap of religious and ethnic identities that imposes a higher level of 
religious assertion among Albanians in Macedonia. In terms of foreign policy 
orientation, however, Islam remains Albanians’ ‘forbidden fruit’ for they see it as 
incompatible with modern European identity, to which they aspire sometimes so 
desperately. The widespread pro-Americanism, which is both conjectural and 
structural, and EU support among Albanians does not promise optimal conditions for 
growth of radical Islamic movements. Nevertheless, it is obvious that recently Islam is 
playing a bigger role in both politics and society among Albanians in Kosovo and 
Macedonia.  
In every case, it is the overall political and social context that shapes the 
development and transformation of identity, and in this context, religious identities as 
well. In the case of the Albanians and Islam, the growing foreign influence after the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia has left considerable traces in the region and has introduced 
followers of traditional forms of localized Islam to a new and radically different form 
of Islam known as Salafism or Wahhabism. The appearance of long beards and 
niqab
17
 are a clear expression of this influence. Although it is obvious that the spread 
of this reactionary and austere interpretation of Islam in the region has become visible 
after the dissolution of the SFRY, it is an extreme exaggeration to speak of "[t]he 
coming Balkan caliphate"
18
. The fact remains that both Kosovo and Macedonia are 
oriented towards EU membership. As such, it is not in these states’ interest to see their 
Muslim populations radicalised. This does not mean, however, that various 
international networks of faith-based organisations and Islamist fundamentalists will 
not make any further attempt to spread their influence and eventually change the face 
of Islam in the region. It is undeniable that Wahhabis are present in the region, 
including in Kosovo and Macedonia, and that there are centres where radical brands 
of Islam are preached. However, the simple fact of their existence does not necessarily 
mean that Wahhabism is becoming a trend in the region.  
As far as Turkey is concerned, the state is a close ally of both Kosovo and 
Macedonia and this status provides for more opportunities for Turkey-based 
organisations to operate in the Balkans. Turkey's constitutional secularism makes it a 
more credible ally in the eyes of the Balkan countries, in addition to the common links 
from the Ottoman past. This way, one can speak of an increasing role for Turkey in 
the Balkans—as a protector not only of Muslims, but also of smaller nations more 
generally, like in the case of Macedonia. It remains to be seen how these countries 
will react to Turkey’s newest foreign policy vision of having ‘zero problems with 
neighbours’ and how it will reflect on the spread or religious and cultural 
organisations from Turkey in the Balkans.    
Finally, a problem, both practical and analytical, is the use of the term 
‘Wahhabi’ to describe anything that is different from the local tradition of religious 
practice. Or, even worse, the term is often used by local people to discredit opponents 
in occasional power struggles within the Islamic Communities in Kosovo and 
Macedonia. Therefore, it is essential that the whole complexity of ‘Wahhabism’, both 
as doctrine and transnational movement, be placed in the context of the globalisation 
of Islam and its effects in various regions of the world, including the region of the 
Balkans. Without a critical appraisal of this complexity, long beards and niqab on the 
streets of Prishtina and Skopje do not tell us much about the role of Islam in everyday 
life and the spread of ‘Wahhabism’ in the Balkan region as a whole. 
 
 
Notes 
                                                 
1
 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the international workshop ‘After the Wahhabi 
Mirage: Islam, politics and international networks in the Balkans’ at the European Studies Centre, 
University of Oxford in June 2010. The research project, on which this paper is based, has been made 
possible by a Small Research Grant from the British Academy. I would like to thank Kerem Oktem for 
his invaluable comments on the earlier versions of this paper. 
2
 Migration and expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro to Albania and 
Turkey, which had started already during the Balkan Wars, continued throughout the interwar period. 
As far as the numbers are concerned, according to Malcolm (2006), between 90,000-150,000 Albanians 
left Yugoslavia in the interwar period.  
3
 Only in 1974, when Kosovo became an autonomous province of Serbia and constitutive element of 
the Yugoslav federation, an association of dervishes from Kosovo came to surface from the 
underground. For a detailed analysis of the Sufi orders in Kosovo see Duijzings (2000). 
4
 On the other hand, no other Albanian political party showed an Islamic orientation, neither in name or 
in program.   
5
 See the official web page of the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Pristina: < http://www.fsi-
ks.org/index_files/themelimi.htm > 
6
 So-called after its spiritual leader, Muhammad b. ‘Abd al Wahhab (1703-1792), which aimed to 
invigorate Islam by sweeping away corruptive and sinful practices. See Choueiri (1999) and Blumi 
(2005). 
                                                                                                                                            
7
 The UN administration in Kosovo even praised the work of the SJCRKC in providing relief assistance 
to citizens. See Kosovo's U.N. Administration praises Saudi Relief Committee, 25 May 2004, available 
at: < http://www.saudinf.com/display_news.php?id=1958 > [last accessed 5 November 2010]. 
8
 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. Available at: http://www.assembly-kosova.org  
9
 See the Political Program of the Party of Justice, available at: www.drejtesia.org.  
10
 Relations between Albanians and Turkey have been seen either through the nationalist romantic 
point of view (‘five centuries of Ottoman oppression and yoke’) or through a more religious-based 
perspective that sees Turks as religious fellows and natural allies of Albanians (against the Orthodox 
neighbours in the Balkans). This is part of a broader and longer debate on Albanian identity. 
11
 The ‘Gülen Movement’, which has been continuously spreading its educational activities in more 
than 130 countries in around 20 world languages, began formally in Kosovo on 1 October 2004, 
through the Foundation for Education and Culture ‘Atmosfera’, initially in Prizren and since 2006 in 
Pristina. See J. Mehmeti and S. Mehmeti (2009). 
12
 For more see the official site of TIKA: < www.tika.gov.tr >.  
13
 The Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, 17 November 1991. Available at: < 
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/mk00000_.html > [last accessed: 15.06.2010]. 
14
 Even before the dissolution of the SFRY, Macedonian authorities, under the pretext of the threat of 
assimilation of the non-Albanian Muslims, have urged Slavic Muslims to form separate religious 
councils. See Clayer as cited in Babuna (2000, 84). 
15
 This is a continuation of the project of the Macedonian state began in late 1990s—after the coming to 
power of the right wing party (VMRO)—to place as many landmarks as possible to prove the 
Macedonian and Orthodox character of the capital city. A case in point is the erection of a 66 meter 
cross, known as the ‘Millennium Cross’, on the top of Skopje’s surrounding mountains, overlooking 
the city.    
16
 As a reaction to Turkey’s increased influence in the Balkans (outlined by the Foreign Minister of 
Turkey, Ahmet Davutoglu, in a speech in Sarajevo last year) many Albanian intellectuals from Kosovo, 
Macedonia and Albania have expressed their suspicion toward Turkey’s new foreign policy and its 
implications in the case of Albanians. Some view it as a ‘Neo Ottomanism’. See Xhaferi (2009) and 
Misha (2010). 
17
 In recent years one can observe a (rather slight) increase in the number of young girls who wear 
hiqab (headscarf), especially in Kosovo. However, contrary to niqab, which is a relatively new 
occurrence among Albanians, the headscarf has a longer tradition associated with the patriarchal 
culture dominant especially in rural areas.  
18
 Title of a book published by Deliso (2007).  
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